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I. Introduction 
 
A couple of years ago, an influential  French newspaper ran a series of articles 
denouncing  the 'ultra-liberal' ideology of the 1992 programme. The emphasis 
laid on market  integration,  it was feared,  would gradually  compel  Member 
States to lower their regulatory protection in a growing number of areas, ranging 
from consumer  protection to social policy.1  At about the same time, in a much 
noted speech  in Bruges, Mrs Thatcher  argued forcefully  against  some over- 
regulatory  tendencies she saw developing  in the Community, and warned: 
 
We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only 
to see them re-imposed at a European level, with a European super-state 
exercising a new dominance from Brussels. (Guardian, 21 September 1988) 
 
 I f  anything, the contradiction between these two statements  well illustrates 
the point that the interaction  between market integration and regulation is still 
largely unclear. 
 
*This article has been greatly influenced by lengthy discussions with Christian Joerges and Giandomenico 
Majone, whose contribution is gratefully acknowledged. I am also indebted to Eric Stein for a number of 
comments and suggestions.  A first draft  was presented at a conference  on  'Regulatory  Federalism' 
organized in November 1990 by the European University Institute and the National Academy for Public 
Administration (Washington). 
1 See, for instance, 'Dans Ia jungle du grand marche', Le Monde Diplomatique, September 1988. Edmond 
Maire, a former union leader, saw a similar danger in the field of social policy. See 'Le social, faille de 
!'Europe', Le Monde. 23 August 1988. 
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The purpose of this article is to sketch the patterns of relationships that have 
emerged  between the EC and its Member States in a number of fields which 
belong to what can be defined broadly as social regulation. By social regulation 
we mean here the environment, or the interests of consumers  by correcting 
collateral effects of economic  activities or information asymmetries.2 
This  sector  has  been  chosen  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  In  industrialized 
societies government intervention in areas such as consumer or environmental 
protection has developed considerably over the last 20 years. The phenomenon 
is even more striking when compared to the general crisis of welfare policies. 
The European Community  was not exempt from this general trend. Created as 
an economic  organization, it gradually  expanded  its activities  in areas  like 
environmental  and consumer protection and, more recently, in health policy - 
a transition which, as will be shown later, was not without problems. Academic 
literature  reflected  this  movement  only  after  some  delay:  while  relations 
between the Community and its Member States in the sphere of economic 
regulation  have  been the object  of some  systematic  studies  which  tried  to 
identify the basic principles  underlying the 'economic  constitution' of the 
Community  (Constantinesco, 1977; IEJE, 1972; Mertens de Wilmars, 1988), 
social regulation as a whole has so far received less attention, even if some of 
its branches have been analysed in detail. 
It is worth stressing at the outset that the aim of this article is not to present 
a complete overview of social regulation in the European Community, but rather 
to outline the manner in which the division of competences  between the 
Community   and  its  Member  States  affects  the  way  social  regulation  has 
developed and is carried out in Europe. 
The problems can be subdivided into two general categories. First, what is 
the scope of Community intervention in the field of social regulation, and how 
does membership of the EC affect the Member States' capacity to conduct their 
own regulatory policy? Secondly, how are regulatory interventions organized, 
in particular at Community  level? Of course the distinction between these two 
themes should not be overemphasized, for problems of competence  can have 
(and indeed have had) a decisive influence on patterns of action. However, these 
two categories  provide a good basis for an initial exploration  of the maze of 
relationships  that exist between the EC and its Member States in this area. 
 
 
II. The Scope of EC Intervention 
 
The gradual widening of Community policies to the sector of social regulation 
is a well-known story which need not be repeated here. However, a number of 
 
2   Social  regulation is thus quite  distinct  from  traditional social  policy,  the aims of  which  are  primarily 
redistributive (Majone and La Spina, 1991,  p. 31 ). 
·' For a recent examination of this question see, for instance, Weiler  ( 1991 ). 
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remarks can usefully be made to illustrate the specific features of Community 
intervention  in this field. 
For a long time, social regulation was not a primary concern for Community 
institutions.  The Community  was set up (and  is still often  referred  to) as a 
'common   market'. Quite  logically,  emphasis   was  laid  on  the  removal  of 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital,  persons and services, rather 
than on the control of the side-effects of economic activity. True, from the outset 
the Community  was endowed  with some competences  in the field of workers' 
health and safety,4  but policy areas such as consumer or environmental  protec- 
tion had not gained  political prominence  at the time the Treaty of Rome was 
drafted. The method of sectoral integration which was chosen thus focused on 
the economic field, as exemplified  by the important powers granted to the 
Community  in agricultural and competition  policies. The generous wording of 
Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome clearly suggests  that large sectors of social 
regulation  were regarded as a matter remaining  in the hands of the Member 
States. 
Some 35 years later, the picture looks quite different. A mere glance at the 
Community's 'constitution', the EEC Treaty,  suffices  to portray  how wide- 
ranging the evolution has been. Environmental policy, consumer protection and 
health policy have been added to the list of Community competences, the first 
by the Single European Act, the other two by the recent Maastricht Treaty. This 
shift was reflected in the latter agreement by the renaming of the EEC, which 
is now referred to as the European Community  tout court (Article G(A) ( 1 )). 
The reasons for this change are manifold.  As government  intervention  in 
these areas grew, it became apparent  that divergence  in national  approaches 
could create regulatory barriers to trade, no matter whether they were inspired 
by protectionist   motives  or  not. This  is especially  true as  regards  product 
standards  (Siebert,  1989, p. 55). To take one example,  it is unlikely,  in the 
absence of any co-ordination, that a given good would meet the standards set by 
12 distinct sets of product safety rules. The Community's first response to this 
danger  was essentially  a judicial one. The broad interpretation  given  by the 
Court of Justice  to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty,  which prohibits  'measures 
having equivalent effect'  to quantitative  restrictions in intra-Community trade, 
has had a strong impact on the Member States'  room for manoeuvre. In a 
somewhat  sweeping statement, the Court ruled that 
 
all trading rules enacted by the Member States which are capable of hindering, 
actually or potentially. directly or indirectly, intra-Community trade are to be 
 
4  Article 118 of the EEC Treaty. 
s Article 36 allows 'prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds 
of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals 
or plants; ... or the protection of industrial and commercial property'. provided these do not constitute 'a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade among the Member States'. 
386 RENAUD DEHOUSSE  
 
considered  as measures  having an equivalent  effect  to quantitative  restric- 
tions.6 
 
This amounts  to saying  that even rules which are not designed  to restrict 
cross-border  transactions  can hamper the free movement  of goods.  As such, 
they will come under the Count's scrutiny ex Article 30 (Gormley, 1985). Thus, 
even  in fields  which, as we saw remain primarily  in the domestic  sphere of 
competence,  the Member States must pay regard to the need not to erect 
legislative barriers to trade. As a result, their regulatory capacity can sometimes 
be severely constrained  by their Community  membership.? 
It has therefore gradually emerged that tensions between market integration 
and regulatory  objectives  can be reconciled  only at Community  level. Even 
before the EC was endowed with clear competences in the field of social 
regulation, Community action developed in a somewhat interstitial fashion. A 
strong impetus for the broadening of EC powers was given in 1972 at the Paris 
Summit, where the heads of state and of government recognized the need for a 
more systematic approach to social regulation. 
One of the main avenues for Community intervention was Article 100 of the 
EEC Treaty, which provides for the harmonization of national provisions that 
'directly  affect the establishment  of the functioning  of the common  market'. 
Although the exact scope of this provision and its relationship  to other Treaty 
provisions is the subject of legal controversy,8 the requirement of a direct link 
with the common market makes it clear that it could not serve as a basis for any 
activity  in the field of social  regulation. Likewise, the very concept of 'har- 
monization of national provisions' seems to indicate that complete uniformity 
of national legislation  was not being sought. Resorting to the 'necessary and 
proper' clause of the EEC Treaty, Article 235, thus proved indispensable  on a 
number of occasions.9 
From the 1970s, EC intervention gradually evolved on this dual basis, at first 
covering fields where it was clear that national legislation created obstacles to 
trade - notably product regulation - later expanding  to pave the way towards 
fully-fledged consumer and environmental  protection policies. Yet, the concept 
of a common market does not provide any guidelines as to how regulatory 
policies ought to be conducted, or what level of protection ought to be reached: 
all that market integration  seems to require is a measure of uniformity.  The 
contrasts between diverging national traditions and the lack of a consensus on 
 
6 ln case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974) ECR 837. 
7  See, e.g., case 178/84 Commission  v. Germany, ECR [1987)  1262 (the 'German  beer' case) and the 
comments in Sedemund ( 1988). 
• It is now generally accepted that it can cover product-related requirements as well as producer-related 
requirements such as emission standards, that impinge on competitive conditions (Rehbinder and Stewart. 
1985, pp. 21-6). See also Ehlermann ( 1987) for the post-SEA discussion of the question. 
9  A prima facie reading of this provision would also suggest that it is not boundless. Yet its extensive use 
from the 1970s seems to defy any attempt at circumscribing these limits in a precise manner (Weiler, 1991 ). 
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the substantive values  to be pursued  by Community policies  clearly  hampered 
their development (Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985; Joerges and Micklitz, 1991 ). 
It is only with the Single European Act that the protection of the environment 
has been given  unambiguous recognition in the EEC Treaty  and that its main 
objectives have been specified.10 At the same time, Community intervention in 
the field of workers' health  and safety  was made  easier  by a shift  to majority 
voting.11 Even so, the wording of the relevant provisions makes it clear that their 
objective is not to pre-empt  Member  States' action,  which  suggests that  this 
change was not accepted easily.  Article  130R, for instance, specified that  'the 
Community shall take action  relating  to the environment to the extent  to which 
the objectives [of environment policy]  can  be attained  better  at Community 
level  than  at the level  of the  individual Member States.' Although the exact 
status of this provision- mere political  guideline or enforceable legal restraint 
-was debatable, its restrictive intent  was quite clear.12 Community legislative 
competence appeared to be even  weaker  with regard  to consumer protection, 
which  was merely  presented as a concern  to be taken into account in harmoni- 
zation  directives. 1 3  One  had  to  wait  until  the  Maastricht Treaty   to see  the 
insertion into the Treaty  of a comprehensive consumer protection policy. 
Turning to practice, one is struck  by the fact that, despite such institutional 
restraints, activity in the field of environmental protection reached a remarkable 
degree  of intensity even prior to the adoption of the Single  European Act. Even 
though  the  reluctance to approve regulatory intervention in the field  of con- 
sumer  protection was not overcome by the SEA,  the Community's free  trade 
objective, forcefully restated  by the 1992 programme, has led the Community 
to create comprehensive European regulatory frameworks for pharmaceuticals, 
foodstuffs and consumer goods. Increasingly it even intrudes into areas such as 
product liability or consumer credit, where it is primarily the economic interests 
of consumers that is at stake.  In spite of their ambivalence, one may therefore 
look at the new Treaty  provisions as a legitimization of a practice which  had 
already  largely  been accepted. 
It seems  difficult to avoid  the conclusion that the long-term trend  has been 
towards an increase in Community competences. Yet, the movement is less one- 
sided than a superficial examination might suggest. Prompted by market 
integration, Community action  in the area of social  regulation remains  largely 
conditioned by the Community's emphasis on the removal  of barriers to trade. 
 
10 Article  130R. 
11 Article  I 18A. 
12 This provision  was deleted by the Maastricht Treaty, as it duplicated the subsidiarity principle established 
by Article  38. 
u Article  IOOA (3). True,  if it is to be meaningful. this reference suggests that some sort of Community 
action  is necessary  (Joerges, 1990);  yet  it seems  difficult   to ground  in such  an elliptic reference the 
foundation of a proper Community competence for the protection  of consumers. a competence which could 
go beyond the objective of furthering the harmonization process  (VerLoren van Themaat, 1990). 
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One  could  summarize the  situation by speaking of the  'dual  subsidiarity'  of 
social regulation in the structure of the Treaty of Rome: subsidiarity with respect 
to the Community's main  raison d' etre, namely  market  integration, and sub- 
sidiarity  with respect  to national regulatory policies. 
This tension appears quite clearly in the title devoted  to consumer protection 
in  the  Maastricht Treaty. On  the  one  hand,  the  possibility of  dealing   with 
consumer protection matters  in the context  of internal  market  policy  (Article 
1OOA) is confirmed; on the other hand, the Community's power to act 'to protect 
the health, safety and economic interests of consumers and to provide them with 
adequate information' is recognized, but such  action  must  only  'support and 
supplement the policy pursued  by the Member States'.14 For those who would 
regard  the above  developments as  being  symptomatic of  lawyers' formalist 
mode  of reasoning, it might  be useful  to recall  that  in contrast  to the  power 
dynamics in 'classical' federal  systems, Member  States  retain a central  role in 
the Community decision-making process  (Scharpf, 1988).  Not only  will prob- 
lems  of competence surface each  time  a Community measure  is deemed by 
certain  governments to be too intrusive  but, equally  importantly, patterns  of 
Community  intervention are  likely  to  bear  the  mark  of  these  institutional 
restraints. 
 
 
III. Patterns of EC  Intervention 
 
One  of the striking features of the American way of approaching regulatory 
issues is a clear reluctance to accept outright federal intervention. Even in fields 
where legislation might  be legitimate, Congress has often  preferred  to rely on 
a carrot-and-stick approach by  setting   up  large  grants-in-aid  programmes, 
which aim at inciting states to adopt the standards worked out at the federal level 
(Stein,  1985).  Likewise, federal  intervention has often  taken  the form  of the 
establishment of specialized agencies, to which some rule-making, fact-finding 
and enforcement powers in a specific field were given. The functional arguments 
that  have  been  used  to justify  the creation of such  agencies are  particularly 
interesting since  they could  easily  be transposed to the Community. It is often 
argued,  for instance, that the delegation of powers  to administrative agencies 
represents a means  whereby  specific problems might  be entrusted to experts 
who possess  a deep knowledge of the industry  which they regulate, and a way 
of insulating decisions from  the pressures of party politics  (Majone, 1989). 
Yet,  turning  to the  European Community, one  might  not discern similar 
developments: in the field  of social  regulation, harmonization of national 
legislation has remained the primary  form of action. The EC has occasionally 
provided  guidelines for implementation by the Member States,  requiring them, 
 
14 New Article  129A. 
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for example,  to collect  specific  data,  or  mutually  to  inform  each  other  of 
decisions adopted in a given field. 1 5 Yet, if one overlooks the important powers 
enjoyed by the Commission  in the framework of competition  or anti-dumping 
policies, the Community  has never really departed from its traditional mode of 
decentralized  administration. 
Why this difference? In theory, two answers seem possible: either the 
functional needs alluded to were not felt as strongly in Europe as in the United 
States, or they were addressed  with different  techniques.  The correct answer 
probably lies in a cocktail of these two elements. 
In the first place, it should  be noted that few alternatives  to a legislative 
approach were available at the Community  level. The Community  has limited 
financial resources, and a large part of these are devoted to a voracious 
agricultural  policy, leaving only limited room for manoeuvre in other sectors. 
In any event,  it seems clear  that the principle  of attributed  powers  makes it 
impossible for the Community to use its spending powers beyond its sphere of 
legislative competence (Lenaerts, 1990, p. 233). As early as 1958, the European 
Court of Justice also indicated that delegation of powers to ad hoc bodies, not 
envisaged  by the ECSC Treaty,  was possible only subject to strict conditions 
and that, in any event, the delegation  of broad discretionary  powers was not 
permitted. 16  The difficulties  which  surrounded  the creation  in  1990 of the 
European Environment Agency have confirmed that the US agency model is far 
from being commonly  accepted in the Community. 17 
However, to state that the Community's institutional  framework did not 
provide the same variety of tools as are found in the United States somewhat 
begs the question: why then, did the framers of the Community treaties choose 
to limit the Community to intervention of a legislative type in the field of social 
regulation? There is no clear-cut answer to such a broad question: the legislative 
history of the EEC Treaty is not yet accessible, and it is far from certain that the 
issue was addressed at the time the Treaty was negotiated. Notwithstanding this, 
several factors can be identified  which might explain the current situation. 
The first factor is the limited Community competence  in the  field of social 
regulation. As indicated above, the Community was supposed to act only if, and 
 
"See. for instance. the common  position  adopted  in October  1991  by the Council  of Ministers as regards 
the  proposed  directive on general  product  safety,  or directive 83/189  establishing a system  of mutual 
information on technical  regulations adopted  at national  level (OJ L 109/8,  26 March  1983). 
'"Case I 0/56, Meroni. ( 1957-58] ECR 157.It is generally held that although  this ruling dealt with the fairly 
detailed  provisions of the ECSC Treaty. its conclusions are mutatis mutandis applicable in the broader 
context of the EEC Treaty  (Kapteyn and YerLoren  van Themaat, 1989, pp. 121-2). However, it is not clear 
that the Meroni  precedent would be of great  help in the area of social  regulation. as powers  delegated to 
agencies would be taken away  from the Member  States, rather  than from the EC. 
17 See the Co unci I   Regulation on the establishment of the European  Environment Agency, OJ L 120/ I, II 
May  1990.  The  Commission has  recently  advocated  the  establishment of  an  agency   to  regulate   the 
marketing of medicinal drugs,  but the powers of the proposed  body have been adapted  to meet the concerns 
expressed by the Court  in the Meroni  case. See the Commission's proposal  in OJ C330/l. 31 December 
1990 and the amendments in OJ C310/7,  30 November  1991. 
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to the extent that, national regulatory policies had an adverse effect on the 
establishment  of a unified market. It was therefore proper to limit its interven- 
tion to a mere harmonization of national provisions, rather than endowing it with 
more  substantial  means  of  action.  The  emphasis  on  the  harmonization  of 
national  provisions  can  thus  be  seen  as  an  institutional   reflection  of  the 
peripheral importance of social regulation in the Community context. Indeed, 
Community lawyers tend to insist that the use by the Community of its 
competences  should  be such  that it will  not completely  pre-empt  Member 
States' competence in the area of social regulation. 18 Hence, inter alia, a strong 
insistence on the resort to directives,  which need to be transposed by national 
authorities into their legal orders, and thus leave them in theory a certain leeway 
as to the methods by which their objectives are to be achieved.l9 
A second factor is the central role of the Member States in the Community 
system. The Community  is a far less autonomous  body than any federal 
government. Member States still largely control the legislative process; they are 
responsible for the implementation of most Community acts. Weiler has argued 
convincingly  that the expansion of Community competences  in the 1970s and 
the early 1980s can be understood only in the light of this. By virtue of Member 
States'  near total control over the policy-making and implementation process, 
the Community appeared much more as a mere additional  instrument in their 
hands, rather than as a usurping power. Thus a mutation which in any federal 
system would have been at the expense of the component  units and, as such, 
would have met with considerable opposition, was readily accepted by the 
Member States of the Community (Weiler,  1991) 
However,  the expansion  of  Community  powers  can  retain  this  neutral 
character only as long as Community intrusion into spheres which have 
traditionally been part of the Member States' competence is compensated for by 
the representation  of the Member States at all stages in the decision-making 
process. This concern has led to the establishment  of expert committees, 
composed  of Member States  and Commission  representatives, to assist  the 
Commission  in its executive functions (preparation  and implementation of 
Community legislative acts). Although the working practices of such committees 
have so far been the object of little systematic attention, it seems that the 
Commission's role in these procedures is primarily one of co-ordination 
(Cassese,  1987). Thus, the functional  need for expertise  to which I referred 
earlier has been accommodated, but in a manner that clearly reflects the specific 
features of the Community's institutional setting. In contrast, the delegation to 
 
 
,. See, for instance, the debate  in Fallon  and Maniet ( 1990)  regarding product  safety. 
19 Article  189 of the EEC Treaty. Member  States' sensitivity on this issue  was confirmed by the adjunct 
to the Single  Act of a declaration inviting  the Commission to make  use of directives in its proposals 
pursuant to Article  IOOA whenever harmonization involves the amendment of legislative provisions in one 
or more  Member  State. 
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an autonomous body of wide-ranging law-making and enforcement  powers, 
similar to those enjoyed by US regulatory agencies, is likely to be resented by 
the Member States as more intrusive, since it would alter the delicate balance 
of power which has presided over the growth of Community competences. 
Undoubtedly,  concerns  of  this  kind  have  played  an  important  part  in  the 
definition of the functions granted to the newly established  European Environ- 
ment Agency, which is more concerned  with research and data collection  than 
with regulation  per se. 
Lastly,  mention  should  be made of elements  of European  administrative 
culture which have also played a role, albeit an indirect one, in the developments 
under review. The creation of specialized agencies endowed with extensive 
powers is a far from traditional  feature  throughout  Europe. On the contrary: 
regulatory functions are often assigned to ministries, or to the cabinet as a whole 
(Majone, 1989). Even in the realm of monetary policy, where the need for 
expertise is widely accepted, the recent debates over the creation of a European 
system of central banks have clearly shown that most central banks do not enjoy 
the same degree of autonomy  as the German  Bundesbank.  Many of them are 
still largely dependent on decisions made by the Treasury. Governmental 
supervision and, indirectly, parliamentary  monitoring of administrative  action 
are often regarded as necessary in a democratic society. All this makes it rather 
unlikely that national governments  will be willing to concede to Community 
bodies  powers  which they are not always  prepared  to delegate  to domestic 
bodies. 
As mentioned above, the prototype of Community  intervention has been to 
harmonize national laws. As a result, most reviews of Community  policies are 
essentially  lengthy catalogues  of legislative  provisions. However, a problem- 
oriented approach reveals a number of flaws, the origins of which can be traced 
to this particular profile of Community  intervention. 
The difficulties  which surround the harmonization  process are well known. 
Decision-making is slow and cumbersome  because of the ever-growing  com- 
plexity of the subjects covered  and the necessity  to achieve consensus. The 
adjustment to technical progress is difficult (Dashwood,  1983). Moreover, 
harmonization  is achieved  through  resort  to an instrument  - the directive  - 
which has to be transposed  by Member States into their domestic legal order. 
This often results in huge bottlenecks at the implementation  level; it may also 
explain the attention given by Community bodies to formal compliance, namely 
the adoption by national legislatures of the measures prescribed by directives, 
rather than to substantive observance of their provisions.20 Although the 
Commission has repeatedly stated its intention to go beyond transposition, and 
to  monitor  administrative   application   more  systematically, it  is  not  clear 
 
20 The yearly  reports on the implementation of Community law provide  a good example for the point at 
issue. See. for instance. the Eighth  Report. COM (91)  321 final,  16 October  1991. 
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whether it is well equipped  to do so. Lastly, this two-tier legislative  process 
means that the Community is deprived of any direct power over firms and other 
private actors, which are the real subjects of social regulation, since it does not 
have the power to attach sanctions to the violation of Community standards and 
to enforce them. 
All these  elements  clearly  curtail  the  overall  efficiency  of Community 
standards. Another problem is the lack of flexibility inherent in such a system. 
As indicated  above,  the harmonization  process  was dominated  primarily  by 
market  integration  concerns,  with a  parallel  emphasis  on  uniformity.  This 
tendency was further aggravated by the fact that the Community, being deprived 
of an administrative   power  of its own,  has often  resorted  to very  detailed 
directives  in order to ensure their uniform application. It is doubtful  whether 
such a process is capable of fully addressing  the variety of situations existing 
within the Community. True, it has been demonstrated  that, even in its current 
stage of development,  Community  law possesses a wide range of techniques 
providing  an important  measure of flexibility  (Ehlermann,  1984). Yet, for a 
variety of reasons, not all difficulties  may be anticipated  or accommodated  in 
a complex and fairly inflexible legislative phase (Scharpf, 1988). Very often, it 
is only when applying a norm to a concrete problem that the various interests 
involved can be properly assessed and balanced. The regulation of pharmaceutical 
products offers an example of such a situation: although national rules pursue 
similar  objectives,  their application  differs  widely from  country  to country 
because  of  existing  divergences   between  medical  and  regulatory  cultures 
(Kaufer, 1989). 
Naturally, this plea for flexibility should not be seen as an invitation to grant 
greater discretionary  powers to the Member States, if market integration is not 
to be put at risk. But the issue will have to be addressed eventually: otherwise, 
there is a real risk that Community regulation will aggravate an already serious 
implementation problem by being insufficiently sensitive to the variety of 
situations  with which national regulators have to deaJ.2I 
Awareness of these problems has clearly grown in Community circles over 
the last few years. Several features of the internal market programme aimed to 
provide a remedy for the shortcomings of the earlier approach. The emphasis on 
the mutual recognition of national regulations and standards, and the delegation 
of quasi-legislative powers to private standardization bodies were conceived as 
alternatives to a cumbersome rule-making process. As a result, the White Paper 
suggested  restricting  harmonization  to the laying down  of basic health  and 
safety  requirements  (CEC,  1985, p.18). It was also envisaged  that this new 
approach would increase the range of choices available to consumers,  thereby 
 
21 In this respect,  it is worth noting  that the southern  Member  States  of the Community, where there is no 
strong   tradition  of  regulatory intervention, are  among  those  countries which  have  experienced  great 
difficulties in transposing EC directives. 
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creating proper competition  between national rules. The assumption is that this 
process will facilitate technical and regulatory adjustment and lead eventually 
to convergence around one or a few basic models. Thus, ex-ante harmonization 
would  be,  in  part  at  least,  replaced  by  a  market-driven   process  resulting 
ultimately  in spontaneous adaptation  (Prosi, 1990).  Yet, in spite of its many 
advantages, mutual recognition is not a panacea. It is not adapted to all kinds of 
goods,  nor can it deal  with all regulatory  problems  (Siebert,  1989; Majone, 
1991 ). In fact, rather than as a regulatory technique, mutual recognition should 
be seen as an integration  instrument, which creates pressures in favour of the 
removal of trade barriers. Thus, how exactly regulatory interventions should be 
conducted at Community  level remains largely an open question. 
 
 
IV. The Dynamics of Regulation in the European Community 
 
The above elements may be useful in understanding some basic differences 
between  the dynamics  of regulation  in the United States  and the EC. In the 
American context, the federal government  has very often played a pioneering 
role in the field of regulation (Beer, 1974). In part at least, this was linked to the 
fact that the states are more exposed to pressure from industry, which may easily 
increase the political costs of regulation by threatening to site itself outside the 
state borders. To many interest groups, federal action therefore appeared to be 
the only available way to strengthen government intervention in specific fields: 
the only alternative to federal action was no intervention at all, rather than action 
at state level (Sternberg, 1990). The 'New Federalism' policies of the 1970s and 
the 1980s, because of their joint emphasis  on deregulation  and their swing in 
favour of the states, confirmed a contrario the basic equation between regula- 
tion and federal intervention.  Federal regulation was also favourable to indus- 
try,  as  it  avoided  the  risk  of  inconsistent   regulations  at  state  level,  with 
consequent  market fragmentation. 
A similar constellation  has yet to emerge in the European Community. Like 
their American counterparts, export-oriented industries clearly have an interest 
in the removal of legislative barriers to trade-hence their strong support for the 
1992 programme. In contrast, representatives of diffuse interests, like consumer 
or environmental protection organizations, have shown more ambivalent feelings 
towards the Community,  in particular in Member States where high standards 
of protection already exist.22 
Why this has been so can be understood only with reference to the structural 
elements mentioned earlier. The emphasis on free movement in the Treaty of 
Rome and the generous  way in which relevant  provisions of the Treaty have 
 
 
"See. for instance, Bourgoignie ( 1987, pp. 121-3, 215-16) who deplores the absence of a strong European 
consumer movement. 
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been read by the European Court of Justice have to a large extent limited the 
Member States'  capacity to regulate their own economies- not because of a 
congenital objection to any kind of government intervention, but rather because 
it was felt that such intervention  should not hamper free movement or distort 
competition.23 This appears very clearly in the Court's case-law on free 
movement of goods: in case of conflict, free movement prevails as a rule over 
regulation. There are of course several important exceptions to this rule, some 
of which are explicitly mentioned in Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome. The Court 
of Justice has also admitted that consumer and environmental  protection can, in 
given circumstances,  justify the maintenance of obstacles to free movement.24 
But these are only exceptions to a general rule and, as such, they are construed 
narrowly.25 The Court has stressed that Article 36 should in no way be seen as 
reserving given powers to the Member States.26 
At the same time, the Community  has been relatively slow to establish  its 
own regulatory activities. Not only was its legal title to intervene in the field of 
social regulation rather thin in a first phase, but the nature of Community 
decision-making processes is such that Community  regulatory intervention  is 
often difficult to achieve, since the Community is far less immune from Member 
States'  influence than the US federal government. In such a context, a political 
consensus of the necessity of acting at the European level will be a prerequisite 
to any kind of Community  intervention. This tends to give a bargaining 
advantage to Member States which oppose high levels of protection, who can 
trade their acceptance of Community intervention against a number of substantive 
concessions.  The  problem  was further  complicated   by  the  fact  that  some 
countries in which a regulatory tradition existed, such as Denmark or the United 
Kingdom, did not favour large transfers of power to the Community. 
Adopting a comprehensive view of social regulation, encompassing  both the 
national and the EC level, some have argued that the division of competences 
between the EC and its Member States created a true 'regulatory gap': whereas 
in  theory  Community  competences   remained  limited  and  difficult  to  use, 
Member States'  Treaty obligations made it more difficult for them to exercise 
fully the regulatory  competences  they still  retain (Bourgoignie  and Trubek, 
1987). This deregulatory bias was implicitly acknowledged by Member States' 
 
 
 
2·' A similar reasoning was defended by Pescatore ( 1979) as regards economic regulation. 
24 See cases 120/78.REWE v. Bundesmonopoll•erwaltunx fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), [ 1979] ECR 
649 and 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, [1988] ECR 4607. 
" To assess the admissibility  of a national rule that falls under Article 30, the Court has resorted to a 
principle of proportionality: the rule will be regarded as compatible with the Treaty only if its regulatory 
objective could not be achieved by other means, less detrimental to free movement. Hence, inter alia, a 
strong insistence on 'informative  labelling'  (Von Heydebrand u.d. Lasa, 1991 ).Moreover, the onus is on 
the Member State concerned to demonstrate that its regulation was necessary. 
'"Case 5/77, Simmenthal, ECR [ 1977] 1555, p. 1557. 
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representatives at the time of drafting the Single Act: in direct contradiction to 
the case-law of the European Court of Justice,27 it was felt necessary to provide 
for escape clauses enabling Member States which enjoyed high levels of 
protection to retain their national rules even in the presence of harmonization 
measures.28 Interestingly, no corresponding mechanism was provided for those 
Member States which favour a lower level of protection, which may be seen as 
a confirmation that the system as it stood was not seen to involve real dangers 
for them.29 
The 1992 programme has given rise to increased fears of deregulatory 
pressures. As is known, this programme aims essentially at a complete elimina- 
tion of non-tariff barriers to trade in the EC, many of which arise out of differ- 
ences between the regulatory policies of the Member States. Thus, the thrust of 
the programme consists of increased emphasis on what is often defined as 
negative integration, rather than on a complete take-over of given policy areas 
by the Community. The central technique proposed by the Commission's White 
Paper to achieve this objective was mutual recognition of national standards- 
a concept stemming from the idea that the main regulatory policies pursued by 
the Member States attempt, as a rule, to achieve similar objectives. 
Many expected this emphasis on negative integration to reinforce deregula- 
tory pressures further. Not only would Member States' regulatory activities be 
exposed to increased competition from other States' rules but, in addition, they 
would be more closely monitored than in the past. In theory, in a system of 
complete mobility for all factors of production, firms could even decide how 
best to allocate their resources in order to avoid being exposed to heavy 
regulatory burdens. This might in tum trigger the 'race to the bottom' denounced 
by some American specialists: in order to avoid losing their competitive 
position in the Community market, national governments would be tempted to 
lower their regulatory requirements. The competition between rules brought 
about by mutual recognition would thus lead to a retreat of government in a 
number of areas (McGee and Weatherhill, 1990). 
It is fair to say that neither of these two trends has yet materialized to any 
substantial degree. In spite of the indisputable success of the 1992 programme, 
there is no evidence that it has generated any significant reallocation of 
resources on the part of industry. Neither has a real race to the bottom in terms 
of regulatory protection been noted. True, a measure of government retreat has 
been noticeable in some countries, but this evolution seems more linked to a 
 
 
27 Case 251n8. Denka1•it, ]1979] ECR 3369. 
"Articles 1 OOA, para. 4, and 130R (Relabelled 130T by the Maastricht Treaty). Safeguard clauses inspired 
by the 'Model  Directive· of 4 May 1985 (OJ C136, 4 June 1985) have been inserted in many consumer 
protection directives  (Joerges and Mick1itz, 1991 ). 
29 However, this proved to be a shortsighted  view, as the shift to majority voting made it possible to ignore 
isolated opposition to regulation (Weiler, 1991). 
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general rediscovery of the virtues of the market economy, rather than being a 
mere by-product of the integration  process.30 
Certainly,  the situation  was less one-sided  than a glance  at institutional 
structures might suggest, be it only because the situation was not uniform 
throughout the Community. Most southern Member States, for example, lacked 
adequate frameworks for environmental and consumer protection. Community 
policies have been important for these countries,  both as a source of national 
legislation and as a means of strengthening  the position of environmental 
ministries  and  public  interest  groups  with  respect  to  the  agricultural   and 
industrial lobbies, and their political representatives. 
The advocates of the 'race  to the bottom'  theory also appear to have over- 
estimated the risks inherent in the mutual recognition strategy. What they failed 
to understand  is that mutual recognition cannot operate in a vacuum: for the 
system to work, its basic premise (the equivalence of national provisions) must 
reflect reality. Where the objectives pursued by the Member States or their 
methods diverge, mutual recognition is of no help.31 Thus, as anticipated in the 
Commission's White Paper on the completion  of the internal market, mutual 
recognition is a viable avenue only if accompanied by a harmonization of basic 
requirements contained in national provisions. In this sense, harmonization and 
mutual recognition do not cancel each other out, but rather are complementary 
approaches. Basic regulations and standards,  if adopted throughout the Com- 
munity, should both prevent an unlimited  'race  to the bottom'  and provide a 
target for regulatory convergence. Moreover, a number of elements will act as 
a brake on the downwards spiral: a country lowering its level of protection, for 
instance, would put at risk the health of its own citizens, which might have some 
bearing on their electoral choices (Siebert, 1990). 
Another element which was ill-perceived was the impact of the institutional 
reforms contained in the Single European Act. The Community's competence 
to intervene  in the field of social  regulation  was strengthened, even  though 
somewhat  ambiguously.  A majority  vote was made possible in a number of 
areas, in particular for the adoption of product legislation, which occupies a 
central place in Community activities. This change proved to be more important 
than many initially expected (Dehousse, 1988). Even if majority voting in the 
Council of Ministers remains to a large extent an exception, the possibility that 
a vote will be taken has had a decisive impact on decision-making. Instead of 
negotiating in the shadow of a veto, Member States very often have to negotiate 
while keeping in mind the possibility of being outvoted, should a vote be taken. 
 
 
"' If anything, the oppos ite was true: adoption of the internal market programme and its institutional 
corollary, the Single European Act, was greatly facilitated by the fact that they were in harmony with this 
evolution (Dehousse, 1989; Pelkmans, 1990). 
31 This appeared clearly in case 188/84,Commission v. France (woodworking machines}, [ 1986]ECR 419. 
Another example is offered by the situation in the pharmaceutical products sector (Kaufer,  1989). 
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In many fields where for many years no decision had been possible, compromise 
has now been reached  within months (Ehlermann,  1990). In other words, the 
most radical critique of the White Paper strategy proved to be excessive at both 
levels: the regulatory competition among Member States has not dramatically 
increased, and the possibility of an intervention at the EC level has proved more 
concrete than it was initially thought. 
This notwithstanding, a number of bottlenecks remain. By and large, social 
regulation is still largely regarded as a secondary field of activity for the 
Community-a field in which the EC should in theory intervene only to prevent 
national regulatory policies from hampering free movement. And the fact that 
unanimity is still required in certain sectors, even after Maastricht,32 slows down 
decision-making, sometimes to a considerable extent. It also reinforces the part 
played by jurisdictional  concerns in any decision as to the necessity for 
Community action in a given field. 
However, the deregulatory  pressures linked to the Community emphasis on 
free movement  seem now to be more clearly  perceived  than they were some 
years ago. The dynamics familiar to the observers of the US scene, where ad- 
vocates  of  high  protection  levels  generally  favour  federal  intervention,   is 
gradually emerging. 
Such a change may be prompted by a variety of reasons. Community 
environmental  policy relies increasingly on the active involvement of environ- 
mental groups (Sands, 1990), which may have generated new expectations. As 
indicated above, even national governments appear to be more clearly aware of 
the deregulatory  impact inherent in the current division of labour between the 
Community and its Member States. Ten years ago, it could be asserted that in 
a field such as consumer  protection, 'there  is no situation wherein the national 
policy option is not a ... viable alternative  in the absence of agreement at the 
Community level' (Weiler, 1982, p. 49). This no longer seems to be the case: the 
increasing  reach of Community  law makes it evermore difficult for Member 
States to conduct their own regulatory policies separately. Those Member States 
that favour high protection levels increasingly  prefer to press for a decision at 
Community  level, rather than seeking an escape clause which might harm the 
interests of their own producers.33 Significantly, a country like Denmark, which 
has always shown great reluctance to delegate new powers to the Community, 
has been pressing for a generalization  of majority voting in the areas of social 
and environmental  protection. Thus, even for national governments, jurisdic- 
 
 
12 Although  majority  voting has now become  the rule in environmental policy,  unanimity  is still required 
in certain  cases  (New  Article  130S). 
11  It is worth  noting  in this respect  that the much criticized derogation clause  contained in Art.  IOOA (4} 
has so far never been used. This,  however  does not amount  to saying  that it is meaningless: the mere fact 
that one Member State might have sought  a derogation on this basis, and thus isolate its own market,  may 
have  played a role in some  negotiations. 
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tional interests can give way to regulatory concerns. Assuredly, this shift has 
played an important part in the further extension of Community competences 
enacted by the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
 
V. Conclusion: Regulatory  Gaps Revisited 
 
In divided power systems, regulation is the result of conflicting  pressures, for 
the traditional  questions - what to regulate and how - are complicated  by a 
further problem: at which level should regulatory activities be pursued? These 
issues cannot be debated separately. On the American scene, for instance, the 
advocates of high standards  of protection  tend to favour federal intervention 
because it is more effective; conversely the States'  rights issue is often used as 
a fig leaf by those who oppose regulatory intervention. 
I  have  argued  that  regulatory  and  institutional   issues  are  also  closely 
intertwined in the European Community. The emphasis on market integration 
in the EEC Treaty, with the uniformity pressure it generates, and the difficulties 
linked to decision-making by consensus,  have affected both the scope and the 
form of Community  regulatory intervention. The focus on product regulation 
and the emphasis on a purely economic objective, the removal of trade barriers, 
have their origin in these structural elements. Clearly, regulation in the'Amer- 
ican way' is not a viable option in today's Community. 
The 'classical' regulatory gap theory argues that the overall effect of 
Community intervention has been deregulatory. Whereas Member States have 
seen their regulatory capacity constrained  by their EC membership,  the Com- 
munity has not clearly emerged as a dominant regulator in the manner of the US 
federal government.  As a result, Member States with high levels of protection, 
often unable to secure the development of far-reaching policies at Community 
level, have traditionally  insisted on retaining a margin of discretion. 
To some extent at least, this kind of deregulatory  bias was foreseeable.  All 
divided power systems, precisely because they fragment power, tend to make 
government intervention more difficult- whatever its level or its form. This is 
why the champions of government intervention have never been fond of federal 
systems. The fierce critique of federalism  put forward by Harold Laski in the 
1930s finds an echo in many of the criticisms addressed today at the Community: 
 
Federalism ... is insufficiently positive in character; it does not provide for 
sufficient rapidity of action; it inhibits the emergence of necessary standards 
of uniformity; it relies upon compacts and compromises which take insuffi- 
cient account of the urgent category of time; ... its psychological results, 
especially in an age of crisis, are depressing to a democracy that needs the 
drama of positive achievement to retain its faith. (Laski, 1939) 
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Of course Laski was writing on the forces that hindered the emergence of a 
welfare state, which he supported,  while we are now addressing  the develop- 
ment of some sort of regulatory state. But his analysis of the logic inherent to 
any divided power system remains largely correct. 
It has been suggested that the EEC Treaty may be regarded as economically 
ambivalent, in that many provisions are broad enough to allow the development 
of economic policies that range from neo-Iiberalism to Soziale-Marktwirtschaft 
(Mertens de Wilmars, 1988, p. 26). Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
the combined effect of market integration and power fragmentation  is to make 
government  intervention  more difficult. 
The point seems worth making, as a contribution  to the developing  ideolog- 
ical debate on the integration process (Synder, 1990). But it is not decisive, for 
policies are more than the mechanical product of an institutional  machinery. 
Ideologies,  interests, or the strategies  of decision-makers all play an equally 
important part in the final decision. 
In this respect,  we may have reached  a turning  point in the wake of the 
internal market programme. The constraints  that impinge upon national regu- 
latory policies have accrued but, in contrast, decision-making has become easier 
at the Community level. As the Community is by no means immune from 
pressures for  more active intervention  in fields like environment  or consumer 
protection, and as these have been gaining strength throughout the industrial- 
ized world over the past decades, there are reasons to believe that regulatory 
policies will develop further at the Community level (Majone, 1989). Issues of 
risk control are likely to become central once the Single Market has been 
achieved, and a large number of Member States seem to accept that tensions 
between market integration and regulation can only be resolved at Community 
level. 
This notwithstanding, it is important  to understand  that, short of a major 
change, these pressures will have to be processed by the institutional system of 
the Community. Whatever reforms they lead to, the concerns- substantive, of 
course, but also institutional-of the Member States, will have to be met, as they 
remain the primary actors in the Community  politico-legal  system. We might 
therefore observe the emergence of a new type of regulatory gap, with a 
Community that would be present in an increasing number of areas, but forced 
by institutional considerations to stick to a sub-optimal  mode of intervention- 
the harmonization of laws. If this were the case, the contradiction  between the 
two statements  referred to in the introduction  to this article might prove more 
apparent than real. 
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